What Brazil’s Political Convulsions Reveal About the Global Far-Right
If there is one thing that the last decade ought to have taught us, it is that strong objective factors do not automatically translate into powerful movements, let alone into the spontaneous discovery of the correct line by the masses..
The article identifies two main reasons why far-right figures like Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro and the U.S.’s Donald Trump maintain support despite losing power. First, they have stronger informational infrastructures—meaning they control media and communication channels more effectively than their opponents to spread their version of events. Second, their messages resonate because they tap into real frustrations with the current economic and political system. Many people feel left behind by globalization, austerity, and declining social protections, making them receptive to anti-establishment rhetoric. The article emphasizes that combating far-right narratives isn’t just about correcting misinformation; it requires addressing the underlying issues driving discontent. For example, Bolsonaro’s approval ratings rose during the pandemic not only due to a basic income program but because his framing of trade-offs between health and survival aligned with the lived experiences of poor Brazilians.
The article argues that neoliberalism—a political and economic system prioritizing free markets, deregulation, and reduced state intervention—has thrived by exploiting crises. Since the 2008 financial crisis, neoliberal policies like austerity (sharp cuts to public spending) and labor precarity (unstable, low-paying jobs) have become more severe. These policies are framed as necessary fixes to economic problems, even though crises are often products of neoliberalism itself. For instance, the Eurozone’s design and Brazil’s 2016 expenditure ceiling (a cap on government spending) removed social control over fiscal policy, reinforcing neoliberal discipline. The article cites Naomi Klein’s shock doctrine, which describes how crises are used to push through unpopular neoliberal reforms. Over time, neoliberalism’s justifications have weakened, making its demands for sacrifice seem like an end in themselves rather than a path to improvement.
The article highlights a shift in neoliberalism toward increasingly punitive (harsh or disciplinary) measures, where the logic of cost-cutting has overshadowed any promise of future relief. This is illustrated by the pandemic, where leaders like Texas Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick in 2020 framed the choice as between saving the economy and saving lives, implying that economic survival was the higher priority. The article traces this to philosopher Michel Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, where state policies manage population health based on cost-benefit calculations. However, it notes an asymmetry: while benefits are vague, costs are fixed at zero, meaning the ideal public intervention is often no intervention. This logic normalizes extreme trade-offs, such as the redefinition of herd immunity during COVID-19 from a public health goal to a justification for letting the virus spread unchecked.
The article describes a paradox in far-right politics: while it presents itself as a rebellion against elites, its solutions ultimately reinforce the status quo. Far-right leaders like Bolsonaro, Trump, and the UK’s Boris Johnson campaign as champions of ordinary people but their policies do not challenge the fundamental structures of inequality or neoliberalism. Instead, they promise better outcomes for those currently left behind within the existing system. For example, Bolsonaro’s pandemic response—opposing lockdowns while expanding a basic income program—reflected an understanding of the harsh realities faced by poor Brazilians, who could not afford to stay home. The article argues that this conformist revolt appeals to people who feel powerless to change the system, offering a narrative that aligns with their daily struggles but does not propose transformative change.
The article suggests that modern political systems have adapted to operate with low legitimacy, meaning they retain power even when widely distrusted. This is due to the concentration of economic and political power since the 1980s, as well as institutional reforms that remove key policies (like fiscal and monetary decisions) from democratic control. Examples include the design of the Eurozone, criticized for its undemocratic nature during the 2015 Greek crisis, and Brazil’s 2016 *expenditure ceiling*, introduced after the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. These reforms limit social influence over economic policies, allowing elites to maintain control despite public dissatisfaction. The article implies that this erosion of democratic accountability creates fertile ground for far-right movements, which exploit public frustration without addressing its root causes.
