Reasoning together

Jürgen Habermas, a German philosopher and social theorist, died in 2026 at the age of 96. Born in 1929, he was a leading figure in the Frankfurt School and a defender of deliberative democracy, a system where laws and policies are justified through open public discussion rather than force or tradition. Habermas taught at Northwestern University in Illinois from the mid-1990s to the late-2000s, where his lectures on his 1992 book Between Facts and Norms attracted students from diverse fields like law, philosophy, and political science. His work argues that modern societies survive through collective reasoning, where people exchange ideas and remain open to changing their views based on better arguments. Habermas was known for his nasal voice, thick German accent, and impeccable English, often using chalk and diagrams to explain complex theories.

Deliberative democracy relies on the idea that truth and legitimacy emerge from public discussion, not authority or tradition. Habermas developed this in his 1981 book The Theory of Communicative Action, arguing that modern life requires people to engage in reasoned debate to solve problems. By the 1990s, he applied this to law and governance in Between Facts and Norms, stating that a state is legitimate only if its laws could be justified to everyone affected by them through open dialogue. This process is slow and requires participants to listen sincerely to others, even if it challenges their own beliefs. Habermas exemplified this approach by engaging openly with critiques of his work, demonstrating that reasoning is an ongoing, collaborative effort rather than a fixed set of ideas.

Habermas’s ideas about deliberation were partly shaped by his encounters with Quakers during his visits to the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s. The Quakers’ practice of seeking unity in small, inclusive meetings resonated with his vision of democratic debate, where everyone affected by a decision has a voice. This influenced his concept of the public sphere, first explored in his 1962 book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Habermas argued that modern democratic legitimacy began in 18th-century coffeehouses and salons, where private citizens publicly discussed and judged state affairs. However, he later acknowledged that this early public sphere excluded women and working-class groups, weakening its inclusivity.

Habermas’s 1962 book faced criticism for overlooking the exclusion of women and working-class groups from the public sphere. Scholars like Nancy Fraser and Geoff Eley argued that multiple publics existed alongside the bourgeois one, challenging Habermas’s original framework. In response, Habermas conceded that the exclusion of women was not incidental but structural, rooted in the gendered nature of the public sphere. He also acknowledged the existence of other publics, such as working-class ones, and softened his earlier skepticism about early consumer society. Despite these revisions, he maintained his core argument that commercial and structural forces distort the public sphere, now focusing on platforms and algorithms instead of mass media.

Habermas distinguished between three types of discourse in deliberative politics: moral, ethical, and pragmatic. Moral discourse involves determining what is right or fair, where no experts exist—only individuals working together to reach a consensus. Ethical discourse deals with questions of identity and values, while pragmatic discourse focuses on finding the most effective means to achieve agreed-upon goals. Experts play a role only in pragmatic discourse, where they provide factual knowledge, not moral judgments. For example, climate change policies might involve experts in pragmatic discourse (e.g., carbon budgets) but require moral discourse to address questions of justice, such as who pays for damages.

Habermas initially argued that truth is what people would agree on under fair conditions, a view he held from 1973 until 1999. However, he later revised this position, distinguishing between truth and justification. He acknowledged that a claim can be justified by current standards yet still be false, as those standards can change. While moral claims (e.g., what is right) depend on fair discourse, factual claims must align with reality, independent of human agreement. This shift was influenced by philosophers like Hilary Putnam, who argued that Habermas’s earlier view could not account for the world’s independent existence. Habermas’s change reflected his openness to revising his own theories in light of criticism.